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14. ABSTRACT

Joint intelligence doctrine must continue to evolve to stress the proper focus of intelligence efforts, the fusion of all intelligence, and the effectiveness of intelligence gathering to make operational intelligence relevant to the theater commander in today's irregular warfare environment. This essay reviews recent criticisms of operational intelligence and evaluates joint intelligence doctrine as it applies to IW within the framework of the principles of joint intelligence. While processes described in joint intelligence doctrine address the role of intelligence in IW, there are inconsistencies throughout intelligence doctrine and analytical limitations in the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment process that limit the perspective and agility of the intelligence function. Fusion and collaboration are key principles of joint intelligence, but doctrine lacks methods to incorporate the operational reports that often provide the best IW information sources. Intelligence doctrine should enable tactical level control of collection assets as the front line collectors in IW. Finally, this essay recommends joint doctrine improvements to ensure proper analytical perspective, capitalize on all sources of intelligence, and strike a balance between supporting tactical units and the operational commander.

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REFINING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO IRREGULAR WARFARE

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

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03 May 2010

Contents

Abstract

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Joint intelligence doctrine must continue to evolve to stress the proper focus of intelligence efforts, the fusion of all intelligence, and the effectiveness of intelligence gathering to make operational intelligence relevant to the theater commander in today's irregular warfare environment. This essay reviews recent criticisms of operational intelligence and evaluates joint intelligence doctrine as it applies to IW within the framework of the principles of joint intelligence. While processes described in joint intelligence doctrine address the role of intelligence in IW, there are inconsistencies throughout intelligence doctrine and analytical limitations in the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment process that limit the perspective and agility of the intelligence function. Fusion and collaboration are key principles of joint intelligence, but doctrine lacks methods to incorporate the operational reports that often provide the best IW information sources. Intelligence doctrine should enable tactical level control of collection assets as the front line collectors in IW. Finally, this essay recommends joint doctrine improvements to ensure proper analytical perspective, to capitalize on all sources of intelligence, and to strike a balance between supporting tactical units and the operational commander. Joint intelligence doctrine should incorporate these changes so that operational intelligence remains relevant to today's theater commanders.

INTRODUCTION

The painstaking detail and harsh criticisms in this report are necessary not only because the democratic process demands it, but also to ensure that there is an honest accounting of the mistakes that were made so that they are not repeated.[1]

> \- Senator Pat Roberts
> Report on the US Intelligence Community's
> Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq

The Senate Intelligence Committee's report quoted above was part of a public review of the U.S. intelligence community's assessments leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The report's recommendations, along with the 9-11 Commission report, served as the basis of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, representing the largest reform of the intelligence community since the 1947 National Defense Act.[2] Since then, military leaders and the intelligence community (IC) recommended improvements and critiques. A 2006 University of Maryland study predicted "if current practices continue, the intelligence community of 2020 will experience an imbalance between the demand for effective overall intelligence analysis and the outputs of the individually-oriented elements and outlooks of its various analytic communities."[3] Put another way, the operational environment is getting more complex while the intelligence community is becoming too specialized and focused on tactical analysis. Joint intelligence doctrine must continue to evolve to stress the proper focus of intelligence efforts, the fusion of all intelligence, and the effectiveness of intelligence gathering to make operational intelligence relevant to the theater commander in today's irregular warfare environment.

This essay examines joint intelligence doctrine as it applies to irregular warfare (IW). IW issues now dominate U.S. national security attention and provide unique challenges to the IC. From an intelligence perspective, the nature of IW blurs the boundaries between levels of war. Information flows predominately from the bottom up instead of the traditional top

down flow.[4] The joint intelligence community attempted to address these challenges at the operational level by revising joint intelligence doctrine. The changes are far from complete and criticism of intelligence in Iraq and Afghanistan continues to emerge. This essay reviews recent criticisms of operational intelligence and evaluates joint intelligence doctrine as it applies to IW within the framework of the principles of joint intelligence.[5] Finally, this essay recommends joint doctrine improvements to ensure proper analytical perspective, to capitalize on all sources of intelligence, and to strike a balance between supporting tactical units and the operational commander. Joint intelligence doctrine should incorporate these changes so that operational intelligence remains relevant to today's theater commanders.

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CRITICISM

Operational commanders and subordinate tactical units critique the intelligence function as ineffective at the operational level. General McChrystal indicates national level leaders are not receiving the right information to make informed decisions on the conflict in Afghanistan.[6] General Petraeus' intelligence requirements include information about the population and the Iraqi government which initially exceeded the capabilities of his adversary-focused intelligence staff.[7] Strategic intelligence agencies claim to be "starved" for information necessary to conduct analysis for strategic decision makers.[8] These complaints are symptoms of an operational level problem and reflect the inability to compile, fuse, and translate tactical information to the strategic level.

Tactical level criticism is far more specific in highlighting higher headquarters (HQs) ineffectiveness. The most commonly voiced complaint is a poor understanding of the operational environment. The operational intelligence fusion centers are, "fingernail deep in our understanding of the environment" and do not provide reliable and useful intelligence to

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subordinate units.[9] The problem is so pronounced some experts advise every tactical unit to know all aspects of their environment and to expect very little from intelligence products provided by higher HQs.[10] While part of Kilcullen's prescription is due to the nature of IW, it also highlights a shortage of quality, operational level analysis to inform tactical units. A related criticism is that operational level units are repeating information the tactical level already knows. Operational level intelligence shops spend significant amounts of time reacting to the enemy which often results in classified news reporting instead of analysis.[11] Another common complaint is that the operational level does not properly employ intelligence collection assets. At times, HQs in OIF fielded collection assets with little regard to effectiveness.[12] Finally, almost all commentary on the intelligence efforts in the current conflict notes a shortage of intelligence professionals as a major contributing factor to operational failings. The various IC criticisms collectively point to an operational level intelligence failure to provide senior decision makers proper analysis while providing the tactical level little help in understanding the operational environment. While the joint intelligence community revised its doctrine to provide guidance on how to address these problems, the criticism indicates difficulties remain.

<div align="center">**DOCTRINE FOCUS**</div>

Joint intelligence doctrine prescribes the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) process as the analytical method to support the joint forces commander across the spectrum of conflict. Joint Publication 2-01.3 says JIPOE "provide[s] a disciplined methodology for applying a holistic view of the operational environment to the analysis of adversary capability and intent."[13] The Joint Warfighting Center indicates the new JIPOE process "more thoroughly capture[s] political, military, economic, social,

<div align="center">3</div>

infrastructure, and information aspects of the operational environment: friendly and unaligned, as well as adversary systems."[14] Joint doctrine expands the concept by offering both system and geo-spatial templates for analyzing a given situation and visualizing decisive points. JP 2-01.3 also applies the JIPOE process to an IW case study concerning Somalia in 1992-3.[15] The JIPOE process represents a significant positive shift to describe how analysts can begin to describe the IW environment.

While the JIPOE process effectively addresses the role of intelligence in IW, there are inconsistencies throughout intelligence doctrine and analytical limitations in the JIPOE process that limit the perspective and agility of the intelligence function. Previous reviews of joint intelligence doctrine indicate an overwhelming focus on combat operations with little attention paid to low intensity conflicts.[16] In an effort to make joint intelligence doctrine universally applicable, some terminology remains ambiguous. For example, the DOD Dictionary of Military terms defines an adversary as "…a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisioned."[17] JP 2-01.3 takes a much broader view of the term adversary, to include such non-traditional adversaries as "disease, starvation, and floods".[18] In the same section, the doctrine contradicts the previous broad view by claiming the term adversary, "must be understood to mean a party, groups or individuals, potentially hostile, who may interact with the joint force and could potentially hamper mission accomplishment."[19] The inability to define the term has far-reaching implications and strikes to the heart of many operational intelligence criticisms. The definition of adversary dictates whether the resource limited theater intelligence cells narrow their focus to enemy networks or expand their view to understand other actors in the operational environment. Current senior commanders display a frustration with the

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conventional, adversary-focused approach doctrine provides. General Petraeus criticized his

intelligence staff for failing to identify key leaders within the Iraqi parliament that could

facilitate U.S. interests.[20] General McChrystal's commanders guidance indicates, "We need

to understand the people and see things through their eyes. It is their fears, frustrations, and

expectations that we must address."[21] While the JIPOE process takes a broader approach to

operational intelligence, the adversary-focused terminology remains in doctrine and distracts

from a more holistic analysis.

The JIPOE process prescribes a limited analytical approach that may unnecessarily

constrain analysts attempting to understanding the operational environment. The JIPOE

process advocates a system and geo-spatial analytical approach that allows analysts to

visualize, assimilate, and evaluate mass amounts of data.[22] There are pitfalls when using

models for analytical work. Restricted thinking causes analysts to reject or dismiss pieces of

information that do not fit into their constructed models.[23] Joint intelligence doctrine

narrows the analysts focus by creating a checklist approach focusing on two models while

omitting any reference to additional techniques.

A simple example of the constrained approach in the JIPOE process is the lack of a

temporal analysis structure. There are predictable temporal patterns that help explain

observed abnormal behavior such as regular religious gatherings. Analysts in Afghanistan

study the seasonal poppy harvest to provide insight into adversary disposition, motivations,

and objectives. Less predictable but still relevant events in time, such as the reconciliation of

former enemies may provide further insight into actor motivations. The problem with the

proposed joint doctrine analytical tools is they capture a single point in time. Analysts may

update geo-spatial displays regularly to reflect current data, but a geo-spatial model will not

display trends over time which is critical for analysts conducting predictive analysis. Author Gretchen Peters paints a dynamic picture of the drug trade in Southeast Asia, marked by significant adaptations to the drug network based on factors including the U.S. invasion, inter-clan rivalries, Pakistan security force activity, and the market value of opium.[24] Peters concludes a lack of temporal analysis caused NATO to miss indicators of the Taliban's rapidly expanding role in the region's drug trade.[25] Temporal analysis is just one example of many models used by members of the IC to help deal with the immensely complex IW environment. Joint intelligence doctrine should encourage the use of all proven analytical methods appropriate to improve understanding of the operational environment.

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

While joint intelligence doctrine stresses the importance of fusion and collaboration to widen the aperture of intelligence sources and improve analysis quality, doctrine still lacks methods to incorporate the operational reports that often provide the best IW information sources. JP 2.0 cites collaboration and fusion as principles of joint intelligence to stress the collection and sharing of all relevant information and analysis. JP 2-0 goes on to describe how joint force commanders may achieve sharing and collaboration through an "intelligence sharing architecture" that extends across the interagency and multi-national partners.[26] An emerging trend in today's multinational operations favors effective collaboration and lifts the veil of secrecy that has hindered such cooperation in the past.

Although doctrine addresses the importance of sharing intelligence analysis, the need to fuse intelligence derived from operations remains a significant problem. IW essentially inverts conventional intelligence flow, placing the tactical units out in front and at the top of the information food chain. The best sources of intelligence are typically the units that have

the most contact with the population including front line soldiers on combat patrol, civil

affairs teams, and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).[27] The vast amount of

information from these sources is not available regularly to theater intelligence agencies.

General Flynn, the Deputy Chief of Staff of Intelligence for the International Security

Assistance Force, contends "there are literally terabytes of unclassified and classified

information typed up at the grassroots level."[28] He goes on to argue that tactical units are

unable to send reports higher due to limited bandwidth or report to specific HQ staff

personnel who do not disseminate the information further.[29] One informal survey of PRT

reporting in 2009 revealed less than 25% of PRTs published a regular operations summary of

activities that are vital to understanding the joint force interaction with the local

communities.[30] Sharing information is necessary, but not sufficient to ensure analysts

incorporate operational reporting. Doctrine stresses analysis of intelligence and open-source

reporting but fails to assign responsibility for analysis of operations reporting. An

operational reporting seam exists because doctrine does not identify an organization to

migrate operational information into intelligence channels for analysis, exploitation, and

further dissemination. Theater level intelligence analysts must sort through volumes of

operations reports, assuming they have access, to find relevant intelligence. This creates a

tremendous burden on the analytical power of the intelligence analyst and limits fusion of

operational reporting.

Intelligence doctrine does not recognize the most effective organizational structure

embracing the concept of intelligence fusion and collaboration, the Joint Interagency Task

Force (JIATF).[31] JIATFs are effective because they achieve unity of effort by creating an

organizational structure that facilitates cooperation across the major interagency players

focused on a common problem. While not solely intelligence organizations, many of the components of JIATFs are members of the IC. In each case, the standing JIATFs have no formal relationship with the theater Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) outside of collaboration. The analyst in JIATF-Iraq must accomplish their own JIPOE to support JIATF-Iraq's mission to develop whole of government approaches and neutralize threats to the Iraqi government.[32] Friction occurs between JIATFs and the doctrinal JIOC and Joint Intelligence Support Elements (JISE) for intelligence collection assets, analysts, and national agency support. Regional intelligence fusion cells established in Afghanistan add to that friction.[33] Analytical friction may also occur, resulting in multiple organizations presenting competing intelligence assessments to the joint force commander without a single arbitrator responsible for reconciling differences. While joint intelligence doctrine expresses the significance of collaboration, it fails to reconcile how best to achieve it in light of the broader principle of unity of effort.

CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE ASSETS

Current intelligence doctrine stresses the need for efficiency and effectiveness when managing intelligence collection assets, but places insufficient emphasis on the unique IW environment that requires a tactical focus. Under the principle of unity of effort, JP 2-0 describes the need for "centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution of intelligence operations which enable joint force commanders to apply all available ISR assets wisely, efficiently, and effectively."[34] Air Force doctrine states, "Air and space power is the product of multiple capabilities, and centralized command and control is *essential* to effectively fuse these capabilities."[35] Air Force doctrine asserts centralized control equates to centralized planning, which extends to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.[36]

In practice, many theater commands deal with limited collection assets by retaining control of intelligence assets at the Joint Forces Air Component Command (JFACC) level and attempt to satisfy both operational and tactical intelligence requirements.

The nature of IW requires persistent intelligence collection and synchronized operations and intelligence efforts which result in effective but at times inefficient use of collection assets. Several senior commanders argue joint force commanders should push intelligence assets down to tactical units in an IW environment. General Odierno argues, "ISR must be robust and dynamic and controlled at the right headquarters in order to get commanders the information and intelligence needed to make decisions on a decentralized COIN battlefield."[37] General Mattis is driving Joint Forces Command to enhance small unit effectiveness by empowering tactical leaders with the knowledge, capabilities, and authority to employ joint capabilities, to include ISR.[38] The targeting of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is one example highlighting the amount of intelligence assets required in IW. The operation required over 600 hours of ISR missions to dissect the terrorist network that concluded with an airstrike on Zarqawi.[39] Most metrics of ISR performance tend to place more emphasis on efficiency over effectiveness focusing on sortie generation and on-station time. By any current metric, the tactics used to catch Zarqawi are woefully inefficient, yet the methods have proven successful in providing significant progress toward tactical and operational objectives. For this reason, General Odierno argues that tactical units require organic ISR assets controlled "at the lowest possible level."[40] Through decentralized control, commanders can synchronize intelligence and operations to achieve their objective.

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ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Several senior leaders have proposed alternative methods to correct the perceived multilevel intelligence deficiencies by either redistributing intelligence tasks or manpower. General Flynn proposes a select number of highly trained analysts perform a reporter-like function to gather intelligence. These analysts would travel at the tactical level, integrating information at both tactical units and non-traditional sources to include PRTs, non-government organizations, and civil affairs.[41] These geographically organized roaming reporters may dig out information at the tactical level and make it available to the operational level. The second aspect of his proposal is to create a new information organization at the operational level to serve as an "information broker", collecting, packaging, and disseminating all of the gathered intelligence.[42] The proposal seeks to strengthen the operational tie between the tactical and strategic analysts while drawing on previously undervalued information.

The main difficulty with implementing such a plan is limited intelligence personnel in theater. The traveling core of intelligence analysts draws from full time analysts at the operational level or the pool supporting the tactical level. General Flynn uses the "reporter" comparison several times in his article but does not differentiate between reporters and intelligence analysts. A reporter may investigate a single focused issue for a comprehensive article to meet a publication deadline. Joint force commanders expect intelligence analysts to refine the picture of the operational environment daily as new information becomes available. Traveling analysts detract from that task because they will lose situational awareness while traveling. While most theater commanders generally agree that dividing operational analysts along geographic lines is the best way to support tactical units, the

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complexity of U.S. intelligence collection assets requires some specialized analysts. Threat finance, cultural and language analysis, signals intelligence, imagery interpretation, and human intelligence are all highly specialized fields requiring extensive training. We cannot expect every young enlisted member to fill the shoes of T. E. Lawrence who some senior leaders use as the model intelligence professional. Instead, many theater intelligence organizations rely on a functional distribution of specialized intelligence expertise to maximize their effectiveness. Finally, the creation of yet another intelligence organization at the operational level further dilutes intelligence analysts already in short supply. A solution is required that strengthens the link between the operational and tactical levels without creating new organizations or positions.

Other proposed solutions attempt to augment tactical level intelligence with manpower gained from redistributing operational intelligence tasks. Admiral James Stavridis calls for eliminating what he calls the "spare tire" of intelligence personnel at the operational level in favor of more support at the tactical level offset by more reach back to national agencies.[43] He examined core tasks of the operational intelligence level and proposed pushing critical tasks, such as targeting and order of battle tracking, either to national agencies or down to service or functional components to account for reducing the analysts at the operational level.[44]

Certainly tactical level intelligence units require additional resources. FM 3-24 best summarizes the problem when it states "battalion staffs often do not have the personnel to collect patrol debriefs, analyze incoming information from multiple sources, produce finished intelligence products, and disseminate products to appropriate consumers."[45] In many cases brigade intelligence sections may also be inadequate for a COIN environment.[46] Any

dialogue or personnel exchange between tactical and higher headquarters intelligence organizations will enhance the understanding of analysts at both levels and ultimately increase the value of the resulting products. There is risk in shrinking operational intelligence capacity to augment the tactical level. Operational intelligence is distinct from tactical or strategic intelligence in scope, uncertainty, and the commander's objective.[47] Augmenting analytical capability at the tactical level will likely lead to more successful tactical operations but does little to inform the operational commander's planning process. Similarly, strategic decision makers drive the requirements of national intelligence agencies and operational commanders cannot rely exclusively on strategic intelligence services. Intelligence failures at any level undermine the effectiveness of intelligence efforts at the other levels.[48] Additionally, the distribution of intelligence tasks must match the organizational authorities. General Stavridis's recommendation to push the targeting function down to service or functional components in a time when targeting and the potential for collateral damage has become such a strategic issue increases the possibility of tactical actions working against operational objectives. Separating traditionally linked functions, such as targets and collection management, may also damage the effectiveness of both functions. While providing support to the tactical level is important, theater commanders should avoid sweeping organizational changes to prevent bankrupting operational level intelligence.

Others argue centralized control of intelligence assets provides for efficient use of resources resulting in effective operations. Specifically, many feel centralized control of ISR assets at the JFACC level provides efficient and effective use of air assets. The sound basis for this argument is that ISR assets are a critical shortfall which necessitates some

effectiveness and efficiency balance. One author argues the JFACC is best suited to control ISR because of the resident expertise in the air domain, the established processes for servicing joint task force requirements, and being "best able to facilitate the integration of the multiple intelligence disciplines in a coherent approach to meet the requirements of the joint force."[49] This position argues joint force commanders receive the most effective support when intelligence assets perform at maximum efficiency.

While the JFACC has the required expertise for planning and operating in the air environment, JFACC processes are ill suited for IW targets and integrating IW information sources. Experience shows a persistent and synchronized intelligence network is critical to conducting IW.[50] The joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) and centralized collection plans focus on fixed targets. In IW adversaries take advantage of complex terrain and attempt to blend into their surroundings. Target locations are difficult to determine in real time and nearly impossible to predict within 72-hour air tasking order cycles. While the JFACC is able to control airborne ISR assets, it has little insight into the most critical sensors on the battlefield. Tactical ground units have a better understanding of the IW operational environment and are more prepared to synchronize intelligence collection with ongoing operations.

CONCLUSIONS

Joint intelligence doctrine must evolve to meet the complexities of the IW environment. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review calls for enhanced intelligence capabilities to include intelligence analysis, ISR platforms, and linguists, but sound doctrine needs to serve as the foundation for these added capabilities.[51] First, IW demands unique intelligence support. Intelligence doctrine should emphasize a broader perspective focusing

on non-military aspects of the operational environment in IW relative to conventional operations.[52] This requires an agile analytical framework capable of modeling the environment from multiple perspectives and disciplines. Second, intelligence doctrine should enable tactical level units as the front line collectors in IW. This requires decentralizing control of intelligence assets to synchronize operations and intelligence and enable enhanced fusion with other sources of intelligence. The JFACC expertise in the air domain is absolutely required to govern the use of airspace and operational management of airborne assets. Tactical units must be able to count on the availability of ISR assets for both mission planning and target development. Joint force commanders may achieve combat effectiveness by enabling fully fewer tactical units with the ISR required for mission accomplishment rather than spreading diminished ISR capabilities over more units. Third, operational data is a vital source of intelligence in an IW environment, and intelligence doctrine should emphasize fusion of operations data with other intelligence sources. Finally, operational level intelligence is still required in IW. Failure at the operational level hinders intelligence effectiveness at the strategic and tactical levels. A successful operational intelligence unit may prove effective in IW by assessing progress of the joint force toward operational objectives, tracking networks at the operational level, and maintaining intelligence generated at the tactical level.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Joint Forces Command should change intelligence doctrine to reflect unique intelligence requirements of IW. This change may require a separate intelligence series publication focusing on unique intelligence requirements in IW. JP 2-0 should add comprehensive analysis as a principle of joint intelligence.[53] A proposed description of

comprehensive analysis could be "to facilitate the understanding of the operational environment by focusing on the population, host nation, and adversary."[54] The principle of comprehensive analysis may prevail in an IW environment over other joint intelligence principles.[55] Second, joint intelligence doctrine should clarify the roles and responsibilities of doctrinal intelligence organizations. Commanders need to clearly identify and prioritize information requirements and hold their intelligence organizations accountable if they are not delivering.[56] The trend of adding operational intelligence organizations disrupts command and control and unity of effort. Furthermore, joint doctrine should specify IW operational intelligence tasks to ensure operational units provide required support to operational commanders and tactical units. An operational level intelligence function should include maintaining human mapping databases at the operational level similar to the way JIOCs track enemy orders of battle. While much information may originate at the tactical level, the operational level should maintain the infrastructure, database, and dissemination to ensure data is available to national level analysts and future tactical units rotating into the area. Third, joint force commanders should review allocation of intelligence assets. With the growing number of tactical ISR assets, assets dedicated to SOF, and expanding Army acquisitions, the JFACC's dominance of intelligence assets is diminishing. The doctrinal focus of intelligence asset allocation should focus on prioritization and synchronization, not on who controls a specific platform.[57] These recommendations will improve the effectiveness of intelligence support in IW.

Proper understanding of the operational environment enables the joint commander's decision-making process. Nine years of conflict have refined the intelligence community's tactical capabilities supporting counterterrorism, but recent criticism shows the intelligence

community has missed the mark in supporting IW. Refined Joint intelligence doctrine must stress the proper focus of intelligence efforts, fusion of all intelligence, and effectiveness of intelligence gathering to make operational intelligence relevant to the theater commander in today's IW environment. The joint intelligence community must continually assess and adapt intelligence doctrine to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.

NOTES

1. Senate, *Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the US. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence assessments on Iraq*, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2004, 442.

2. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *9-11 Commission Report*, 2nd sess., 2004, xv.

3. William J Lanheman, *The Future of Intelligence Analysis*, final report (University of Maryland, MD: School of Public Policy, 10 March 2006), ii. This study was commissioned by the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Education and Training and included participants that represented every agency within the intelligence community.

4. U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006), 3-25.

5. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence*, Joint Publication (JP) 2-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 22 June 2007), II-1. The principles of joint intelligence as defined in JP 2.0 are as follows:
Perspective – Think like the adversary
Synchronization – Synchronize intelligence with plans and operations
Integrity – Remain intellectually honest
Unity of Effort – Cooperate to achieve a common endstate
Prioritization – Prioritize requirements based on commander's guidance
Excellence – Strive to achieve the highest standards of quality
Prediction – Accept the risk of predicting adversary limitations
Agility – Remain flexible and adapt to changing situations
Collaboration – Leverage expertise of diverse analytical resources
Fusion – Exploit all sources of information and intelligence

6. Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2010), 4.

7. Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq* (New York, NY: Public Affairs Books, 2008), 178.

8. Flynn, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, 9.

9. Ibid., 9.

10. David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* 86, no. 3 (May/June 2006): 104.

11. Flynn, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, 8.

12. William E. DeLeal, "Finding a Needle in a Stack of Needles," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 31. DeLeal describes shortcomings of the intelligence function based on three combat deployments in OIF. In addition, the author worked for two years supporting tactical intelligence collection in OIF. During that time period, JFACC metrics regarding the employment of intelligence collection assets focused exclusively on platform availability vice mission effectiveness.

13. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2009), xiv. Chapter IV of JP 2-01.3 deals with special considerations when implementing the JIPOE process, to include IW scenarios.

14. Joint Warfighter Center, "Refining How We Thing About Joint Operations," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 44, (1st quarter 2007): 3.

15. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2009), B1.

16. John P. Coles, "Cultural Intelligence & Joint Intelligence Doctrine," *Joint Operations Review*, 2005, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/jfsc_cultural_intelligence.pdf (accessed 24 March 2010).

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19. Ibid., IV-13.

20. Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, 178.

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24. Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda* (New York, NY:St. Martin's Press, 2009), 26.

25. Ibid., 21.

26. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence*, Joint Publication (JP) 2-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 22 June 2007), V-1.

27. Laura Geldhof et al., "Intelligent Design: COIN Operations and Intelligence Collection and Analysis," *Military Review* 86 (September-October 2006): 30.

28. Flynn, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, 17.

29. Ibid., 17.

30. As J-2 Operations Officer of a Joint Task Force under ISAF in 2009, the author was tasked to build a summary of regular reporting from PRTs. While almost all PRTs produced reports on a weekly or more frequent basis, they were most commonly filed over email to a limited distribution group that did not include any representatives from the intelligence community.

31. Gary Luck and Mike Findlay*, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Nongovernmental and Private Sector Coordination*, Joint Warfighting Center Report, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Forces Command, July 2007), 14. The Joint Warfighting Center listed the JIATF as an organizational "best practice" for theater commanders to work with interagency partners to achieve operational objectives.

32. Robert Birkenes, "Interagency Cooperation: The JIATF in Iraq," *Foreign Service Journal*, September 2009, 28, http://www.foreignservicejournal-digital.com/foreignservicejournal/200909/ (accessed 26 March 2010).

33. Phillip Tomio, "Changing the Culture of Military Intelligence," Center for Defense Studies, blog entry posted 27 Nov 2009, http:/www.defernsestudies.org/?p=1153 (accessed 25 March 2010).

34. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence*, Joint Publication (JP) 2-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS,22 June 2007), II-5.

35. U.S. Air Force, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 17 November 2003), 20, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/ (accessed 29 March 2010).

36. Ibid., 20.

37. Raymond T. Odierno, Nichoel E. Brooks, and Francesco P. Mastracchio, "ISR Evolution in Iraq Theater," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 50, (3rd quarter 2008): 52.

38. James Mattis, "Testimony," Senate, *Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 9 March 2010.

39. Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, and Thomas L. Cantrell, "Employing ISR SOF Best Practices," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 50, (3rd quarter 2008): 56. General Flynn's article discusses how effective ISR does not equate to efficient ISR and cites the Zarqawi case as an example of the persistent surveillance required in IW.

40. Odierno, "ISR Evolution in Iraq Theater," 53.

41. Flynn, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, 17.

42. Ibid., 19.

43. James G. Stavridis, "An Intelligent Theater," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 56, (1st quarter 2010): 107.

44. Ibid., 108.

45. U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006), 3-31.

46. Ibid., 3-31.

47. Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Newport, RI: U.S. Navy War College, 2009), VIII-39.

48. Ibid., VIII-39.

49. Danny Wolfe, "ISR: The Right Question to Ask," (research paper, Maxwell, AL: Air War College, Spaatz Center for Officer Education, February 2009), 17.

50. Flynn, "Employing ISR SOF Best Practices," 57.

51. U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Department of Defense Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010), 29.

52. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare*, VIII-26.

53. U.S. Government, *A Tradecraft Primer,* 1. The concept of comprehensive analysis suggested here was developed from the author's interpretation of the CIA document cited. The Tradecraft Primer suggests several analytical techniques to dissect difficult problems and further an analysts understanding of the environment while overcoming various biases that may exist both in the individual and in the intelligence organization.

54. U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006), 3-3. This language mirrors the description of intelligence in the COIN environment found in FM 3-24.

55. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare,* IX-106. Vego indicates planners should not follow principles religiously when formulating an operational idea, but the commander is responsible for identifying which principles to apply.

56. Flynn, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, 10.

57. Lieutenant General Gary L. North, Combined Force Air Component Commander for U.S. Central Command (address, remarks to Air War College, Maxwell, AL, 12 December 2008), quoted in Danny Wolfe, "ISR: The Right Question to Ask," (research paper, Maxwell, AL: Air War College, Spaatz Center for Officer Education, February 2009), 8.

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